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JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2-(3)(a).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED
Issue Presented:
In cases under the "concealment" prong of the "discovery rule," where the
concealment of a fact is alleged to be fraudulent, but the alleged concealment ends prior
to the expiration of the statute of limitations, and where the injured party discovers the
alleged fraudulently withheld fact prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations, does
the alleged fraudulent concealment still toll the statute of limitations?
Standard of Review: Because this case is before the Court on motions to dismiss,
the decisions of the trial court and the Court of Appeals are conclusions of law, reviewed
for correctness. Orton v. Carter, 970 P.2d 1254, 1256 (Utah 1998).
Issue Preserved for Appeal: This issue was central to both the trial court's ruling
and the ruling of the Court of Appeals, Russell/Packard Development v. Carson, 2003 UT
App. 316, Tf 11, 78 P.3d 616. The issue was first raised in Carson's motion to dismiss.
[R. 31-52.]
GOVERNING LAW
The only statutory provision relevant to this appeal is Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25
(3), which provides that claims for breach of fiduciary duty, civil conspiracy, unjust
enrichment, conversion and misappropriation, breach of principal-agency relationship and
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intentional interference with prospective economic relations (the "four-year claims"), are
subject to a four year statute of limitations.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case. The case presents issues regarding the application of

the discovery rule to the statue of limitations governing claims arising out of real estate
contracts which were allegedly concealed from the plaintiffs.
B.

Course of the Proceedings and Disposition Below. In response to the

original Complaint, each of the defendants filed a motion to dismiss. [R. 29, 56, 51.]
Plaintiffs responded by submitting a Memorandum and an Amended Complaint. [R. 58,
72.] The Third District Court, Salt Lake County, heard defendants' motions to dismiss
on April 29, 2003, and Judge Frederick dismissed the Amended Complaint in its entirety.
[R. 149.]
The plaintiffs appealed Judge Frederick's decision, and the Utah Court of Appeals,
Judges Bench, Thorne and Billings, reversed the trial court's dismissal, and remanded the
case for further proceedings. Russell/Packard Development v. Carson, 2003 UT App.
316 at Tf 36. The defendants petitioned this Court for certiorari, which was granted.
C

Writ of Certiorari. The only issue on appeal to this Court is whether or not

the Court of Appeals was correct in holding that the statute of limitations was tolled on
the plaintiffs' four-year claims.
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STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS1
1.

Plaintiff Russell/Packard is a real estate development corporation engaged

in the development and construction of residential homes. [R. 72 at If 1.] Plaintiff
Russell and defendant Thomas were members of PRP, a Utah limited liability company.
[R. 75 at t 18.]
2.

Carson and Bustos were real estate agents for Wardley Better Homes and

Gardens. [R. 74 at | 10.] In the summer of 1996, Carson showed Thomas (who was
acting for PRP), 72 lots for sale, located in the city of Saratoga Springs, Utah County. [R.
76 at If 26.]
3.

PRP made an offer to purchase the Saratoga property, but not until after

CMT, an entity which the Plaintiffs allege was a sham, had contracted to purchase the lots
from Saratoga for $25,000 per lot (the "Saratoga-CMT transaction"). [R. 77 at ^ 33; R.
80 at t 50.]
4.

On November 8, 1996, CMT resold the lots it had purchased from Saratoga

to PRP, at a price of $30,000 per lot. [R. 79 atffif44, 45.] This real estate purchase
contract was entered into by and between CMT and PRP. [Id.] Plaintiffs contend that
this was a "flip sale" designed to benefit the defendants to the detriment of the Plaintiffs,
and that it was not disclosed. [R. 72,ffi[77, 105]. Thus, despite receiving exactly what

1

The relevant facts are based on Plaintiffs5 First Amended Complaint, as this
Court must accept the factual allegations in the Amended Complaint as true. E.g., Prows
v. State, 822 P.2d 764, 766 (Utah 1991).
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they bargained for (i.e., the purchase of the Saratoga property from CMT for $30,000 per
lot), Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit in the fall of 2001. [R. 1-18.]
5.

On or about April 1997, problems arose between Russell and Thomas, and

in an effort to separate their business interests, Russell was assigned PRP's contract to
purchase the Saratoga property from CMT for $30,000 per lot (the "CMT-Russell
transaction"). [R. 68; 39-42].
6.

In a series of closings commencing on or about July 1, 1997, Saratoga

conveyed the Saratoga property to CMT, and CMT conveyed it to Plaintiff Russell. [R.
43 - 45.]
7.

CMT had no relationship to Saratoga or PRP. [R. 80 at % 52.] However,

Plaintiffs allege that they believed that when buying the property from CMT, they were
actually buying from Saratoga - i.e., that CMT and Saratoga were one and the same.2
8.

Plaintiffs have alleged that they believed that CMT was the agent, under the

control of, owned by, or was otherwise acting for Saratoga until the spring of 2000. [R.
81 at f 55.] Plaintiffs aver in their Amended Complaint, Opposition to Defendants'

2

While not necessarily before this Court, Plaintiffs' allegation regarding why they
believed CMT and Saratoga were one in the same is that "Defendants represented to
Saratoga that CMT was part of, affiliated with, or owned by plaintiffs." [R. 82 at t 65
(emphasis added).] Plaintiffs have further alleged that "Believing CMT was part of,
affiliated with, or owned by PRP. Saratoga sold the lots to CMT for $25,000. . . ." [R. 82
at TJ 68 (emphasis added).] The trial court dismissed the fraud claim because even
assuming these allegations are true, the Plaintiffs lacked standing to bring the claim. The
Court of Appeals reversed this decision.

631642vl

4

Motions to Dismiss, and at oral argument, however, that the alleged fraud was discovered
in the spring of 2000. [Id.; R. 68; R. 207 at p.32 (emphasis added).]
9.

Following this discovery, in the spring of 2000, the Plaintiffs plead that they

"were then placed on inquiry notice that CMT may not have been the agent or under the
control of plaintiffs and, after discussions with Saratoga's representatives in the spring of
2000, plaintiffs were first placed on inquiry notice of CMT's control status as well." [R.
81 at ^f 58 (emphasis added).]
10.

The Plaintiffs stated in their opening brief before the Court of Appeals that

they "learned for the first time in the spring of 2000 that CMT was not associated with
Saratoga, which was approximately five months prior to expiration of the four year
limitations period . . . ." [Brief of Appellants, p. 17]. Plaintiffs have also acknowledged
that they were placed on "inquiry notice" regarding the alleged fraud in the spring of
2000. [Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss, p. 11; R. 69.]
Finally, Plaintiffs have pleaded and admitted that any alleged "fraudulent concealment"
ended in the spring of 2000. [R. 81, t 59.]
11.

The Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint alleges, "[a]fter the conversation with

Saratoga's representative [in the spring of 2000] concerning CMT's actual status, further
inquiry and investigation were made by the plaintiffs concerning the ownership and
control of CMT and the circumstances of the two contracts signed in November 1996 by
plaintiffs and Saratoga." [R. 82, ^ 60.] The Plaintiffs provide no additional facts to
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explain why it took them more than one and one half years to confirm or learn more about
what Saratoga told Russell in the spring of 2000. Nevertheless, the original Complaint
was not filed until after the statute of limitations had run on the claims, in November of
2001.
12.

As set forth in the Court of Appeals opinion, the Plaintiffs concede

that absent tolling, the four-year claims would have expired on November 7, 2000.
Russell/Packard Development, 2003 UT App. 316, at f 11.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Court of Appeals erred in holding that because the Plaintiffs alleged
fraudulent concealment, the statutes of limitations on the four-year claims were tolled
despite the fact that the Plaintiffs were put on notice of their claims in the spring of 2000
- several months before the statutes of limitations expired. Thus, because the Plaintiffs
had sufficient knowledge of the facts underlying their claims prior to the running of the
statutes of limitations, the claims are time barred.
ARGUMENT
Six of Plaintiffs' eight claims are subject to a four year statute of limitations:
breach of fiduciary duty, civil conspiracy, unjust enrichment, conversion and
misappropriation, breach of principal-agency relationship and intentional interference
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with prospective economic relations.3 Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25. The Court of
Appeals held that because the Plaintiffs alleged fraudulent concealment, the running of
the statute of limitations on each of the four-year claims was tolled. As set forth below,
however, the Court of Appeals misapplied the discovery rule, and the Plaintiffs' claims
are not saved from the statutes of limitations.
I.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THE FRAUDULENT
CONCEALMENT PRONG OF THE DISCOVERY RULE APPLIES TO
TOLL THE STATUE OF LIMITATIONS REGARDLESS OF INQUIRY OR
CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE.
The Plaintiffs concede that because the real estate purchase contract between PRP

and CMT was executed on November 8, 1996, that "absent tolling . . . its four-year
claims expired on November 7, 2000, and thus its November 30, 2001 complaint was
untimely." Russell/Packard Development, 2003 UT App. 316, at ^j 11.
As the Court of Appeals correctly stated, a cause of action accrues and the statute
of limitations begins to run upon the happening of the last event necessary to complete the
cause of action. Russell/Packard Development, 2003 UT App. 316, at ^ 12 (citing Spears
v. Warr, 2002 UT 24, | 33, 44 P.3d 742); see also Walker Drug Co. v. La Sal Oil Co., 902

3

With respect to the two additional claims, during oral argument before the Court
of Appeals, the Plaintiffs conceded that the commercial bribery claim should be
dismissed; however, the Court of Appeals failed to dismiss the claim in its ruling. [See
Transcript of Court of Appeals' Hearing, p. 17, line 3.] Thus, this Court should dismiss
the commercial bribery claim. With respect to Plaintiffs' fraud claim, because allegations
of fraud implicate the internal discovery rule, the analysis regarding the tolling of the
statute of limitations on the claim is different and therefore was not included in the
Petition for Certiorari to this Court.
631642vl
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P.2d 1229, 1231 (Utah 1995). However, in some cases, "the discovery rule tolls the
limitations period until facts forming the basis for the cause of action are discovered."
Spears v. Warr, 2002 UT 24, \ 32, 44 P.3d 742. Utah courts apply the discovery rule:
(1) in situations where the discovery rule is mandated by statute; (2) in situations
where a plaintiff does not become aware of the cause of action because of the
defendant's concealment or misleading conduct; and (3) in situations where the
case presents exceptional circumstances and the application of the general rule
would be irrational or unjust, regardless of any showing that the defendant has
prevented the discovery of the cause of action.
Id. (quoting Warren v. Provo City Corp., 838 P.2d 1125, 1129 (Utah 1992)). There is no
internal discovery rule in Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-25(3), and Plaintiffs have conceded
that the exceptional circumstances prong of the discovery rule does not apply. This Court
has granted certiorari, however, to address whether and how the concealment prong of the
discovery rule applies to Plaintiffs' four-year claims.
The question presented to this Court is:
In cases under the "concealment" prong of the "discovery rule," where the
concealment of a fact is alleged to be fraudulent, but the alleged concealment ends
prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations, and where the injured party
discovers the alleged fraudulently withheld fact prior to the expiration of the
statute of limitations, does the alleged fraudulent concealment still toll the statute
of limitations?
See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, at p.l.
Several cases state that "the discovery rule does not apply to a plaintiff who
becomes aware of his injuries or damages and a possible cause of action before the statute
of limitations expires." Atwood v. Sturm, Ruger & Company, Inc., 823 P.2d 1064, 1065
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(Utah 1992).4 See also Brigham Young University v. Paulsen Construction Co., 744 P.2d
1370, 1374 (Utah 1987); Burkholz v. Joyce, 972 P.2d 1235, 1237 (Utah 1998) ("In our
view the discovery rule simply does not apply where the plaintiff, at some point during
the limitations period has knowledge of the facts underlying his claim.").
The Court of Appeals, however, found these cases unpersuasive because they do
not distinguish between the fraudulent concealment and exceptional circumstances prongs
of the discovery rule. Russell/Packard Development, 2003 UT App. 316, at ^ 15, n.7. In
reaching its conclusion, the Court of Appeals held that the rule applies differently in cases
of fraudulent concealment, reasoning that "the concealment prong of the discovery rule
applies to toll the statute of limitations on the plaintiffs claims, regardless of inquiry or
constructive notice." Russell/Packard Development, 2003 UT App. 316, at % 15
(emphasis added).
In Walker Drug Co., however, this Court held - directly to the contrary - that an
allegation of fraudulent concealment makes no difference:
The Walkers assert that the period of limitations was tolled until 1992 under both
the exceptional-circumstances and concealment versions of the discovery rule. We
disagree.

4

This is an inartful statement of what constitutes the discovery rule because the
rule embraces "internal discovery rules," and also the "fraudulent concealment" and
"exceptional circumstances" prongs, which are judge-made. Internal discovery rules do
toll the statute of limitations until an actual discovery. However, the rule for the other
judge-made discovery rules is that they do not apply if the discovery is made before the
statute of limitations actually runs.
631642vl
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Before a period of limitations may be tolled under either of these versions
of the discovery rule, an initial showing must be made that the plaintiff did
not know and could not reasonably have discovered the facts underlying the
cause of action in time to commence an action within that period.
Id. at 1231 (emphasis added). The Court concluded as follows:
We conclude, as a matter of law, that the Walkers have not met their initial
burden to show that they did not know and could not have discovered the
facts underlying their causes of action in time to file their complaint within
the statutory period of limitations commencing in 1986.
Id. at 1232.
The application of this rule to fraudulent concealment cases is confirmed in
Berenda v. Langford, 914 P.2d 45, 55 (Utah 1996) (quoting language from Walker Drug
above). In O'Neal v. Division of Family Services, 821 P.2d 1139 (Utah 1991), this Court
confirmed the reasoning set forth in Walker Drug, finding that trial court erred because it
applied the standard to determine whether unjust concealment was established "without
first focusing on a prerequisite to any application of the discovery rule/' Id. at 1144. The
Supreme Court further stated that "an analysis of Myers [v. McDonald, 635 P.2d 84 (Utah
1981)] and other of our discovery cases demonstrates that all have required such a
showing as a threshold matter .. ..". Id. (emphasis added).
Thus, contrary to the holding of the Court of Appeals, Walker Drug dictates that
the Plaintiffs must make a threshold showing that they did not know and could not have
known of the existence of a cause of action prior to the running of the statutes of
limitations. The Plaintiffs admit to the contrary. Indeed, they plainly admit that they
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discovered the fact allegedly concealed in the spring of 2000. [Statement of Facts ^ 8 ].
The Plaintiffs further admit that they were on inquiry notice in the spring of 2000, [Id. at
% 9], and that the concealment ended in the spring of 2000. [Id. at ^ 10]. Thus, the
discovery rule does not toll the running of the statute of limitations.
The Court of Appeals relies on a number of inapplicable cases for the proposition
that the fraudulent concealment itself tolls the statute of limitations. All of these cases are
distinguishable on the same ground - that the alleged fraudulent concealment prevented
the plaintiff from having any notice of the claim until after the statute of limitations
expired. See Hill v. Alfred, 2001 UT 16, at 117, 28 P.3d 1271, 1276 (plaintiff suffered a
loss in 1989, but was not aware of the concealment until July 1995); Chapman v. Primary
Children's Hospital, 784 P.2d 1181 (Utah 1989) (defendants continued to misrepresent
information to the plaintiff even after the statute of limitation would have run). In this
case, by contrast, the alleged concealment ended nearly six months before the statute of
limitations had run. [Statement of Facts U 10].
The Plaintiffs have alleged that "in the spring of 2000 (roughly six months before
the statute of limitations was to expire on the four-year claims), an accountant for
Saratoga questioned the ownership or control status of CMT. . . [and] plaintiffs were first
placed on inquiry notice of CMT's control status as well." [R. 81 atffi[57, 58.] At this
point, according to Plaintiffs' pleading, they knew - contrary to what they allege they
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previously believed to be the case - that CMT was a completely distinct entity from
Saratoga. As Plaintiffs' counsel put the matter during oral argument:
We have alleged that we have a fraud in 1996, and we have alleged that we
didn't discover it in 2000 until the final take down of the last twelve lots
where someone in Saratoga's organization is going through the
paperwork - and we plead this.
[R. 207 at p. 32.]
The Plaintiffs thus admit that the facts supporting their claim were discovered in
the spring of 2000, at least six months before the statute of limitations ran on any of the
four-year claims. Consequently, there is no basis for tolling the statute of limitations with
respect to the four-year claims. As a consequence, the statute expired on November 7,
2000. The Complaint was not filed until November 30, 2001.
II.

THE PLAINTIFFS FAILED TO SHOW THAT GIVEN DEFENDANTS'
PURPORTED ACTIONS, THEY COULD NOT AND WOULD NOT HAVE
DISCOVERED THE CLAIMS EARLIER.
In their Amended Complaint and throughout the course of the proceedings below,

the Plaintiffs failed to satisfy the applicable test set forth in Walker Drug - they have
failed to make an initial showing that they "did not know and could not reasonably have
discovered the facts underlying the cause of action in time to commence an action within
that period." Walker Drug, 902 P.2d at 1231.
Utah courts have long recognized that the means of knowledge is the equivalent of
knowledge:
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Whatever notice is enough to excite attention and put the party on his guard and
call for inquiry is notice of everything to which such inquiry might have led.
When a person has sufficient information to lead him to a fact, he shall be deemed
conversant of it.
U.P.C., Inc. v. R.O.A. General Inc., 1999 UT App. 303, \ 36, 990 P.2d 945, 954 {citing
First Am. Title Ins. Co. v. J.B. Ranch, Inc., 966 P.2d 834, 837-838 (Utah 1998)). The
Utah courts have further articulated that:
[A]ll that is required to trigger the statute of limitations is sufficient information to
put plaintiffs on notice to make further inquiry if they harbor doubts or questions.
Once inquiry notice triggers the accrual of the statute of limitations, a claimant
may not then toll the running of the statue under the principle of exceptional
circumstances.
Macris v. Sculptured Software, Inc., 2001 UT 43 at | 8, 24 P.3d 984, 990. While Maoris
is an exceptional circumstances case, Walker Drug instructs that the test is the same. The
Plaintiffs admitted throughout the proceeding below that they had sufficient information
to put them on notice to make further inquiry in the spring of 2000, before the running of
the statute of limitations, precisely because they harbored doubts or questions. [Statement
of Facts If 11.]
It is true that the Plaintiffs asserted to the Court of Appeals that they "did not
discover actual facts forming the basis for their causes of action until after the November
7, 2001 [sic] deadline." Even assuming this is true, however, the discovery of actual facts
is not the test, nor is there any factual basis to support this statement. The Plaintiffs had a
duty to make an initial showing in the trial court that they "did not know and could not
reasonably have discovered the facts underlying the cause of action in time to commence
631642v1
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an action within that period." Walker Drug, 902 P.2d at 1231. The Plaintiffs have failed
in this duty.
The Plaintiffs' purported injury is based on contracts made in 1996. In June of
2000, the alleged misrepresentations were brought to Plaintiffs' attention by Saratoga.
[Statement of Facts ^f 9]. Hence, all the Plaintiffs needed to do to become fully aware
that they suffered what they believed to be an injury was to ask Saratoga for a copy of the
Saratoga-CMT contract (as Russell already had a copy of the CMT-Russell contract).
There is no reason this could not have been done in June. The contracts would have
disclosed the difference in purchase price, and Carson's role as an agent. The record
offers no insight into what hindered discovery of any additional facts needed to file this
action. Not only is there is no allegation of anything having happened after the spring of
2000 to hinder his investigation but the Plaintiffs plead and admit that the concealment
ended in the spring of 2000. Thus, the Plaintiffs have not pled, nor made any showing,
that they could not have discovered the fraud in time to commence the action within the
limitations period. The knowledge of the fraud and the allegation that in the spring of
2000 the alleged concealment ended is sufficient to demonstrate that Plaintiffs have failed
to make the initial showing, under this Court's holdings, that the statutes of limitations
should be tolled.
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CONCLUSION
The Plaintiffs admit they discovered the alleged fraudulently withheld fact prior to
the expiration of the statute of limitations, and also that the alleged concealment ended
prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations. Consequently, the decision of the trial
court dismissing the Amended Complaint on the four-year claims should be affirmed, and
the decision of the Court of Appeals should be vacated. The commercial bribery claim
should also be dismissed based on the proceedings below.5
DATED this 2 ^ d a y of February, 2004.

JONES WALDO HOLBROGiWLMcDONOUGH PC

George W. Pratt
Ali Levin
Attorneys for Appellee John Thomas

5

The only remaining claim would be Plaintiffs' fraud claim, the First Cause of
Action of their Amended Complaint.
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ADDENDUM
1.

Transcript from the Court of Appeals Arguments

2.

Opinion of Court of Appeals, Case No. 20020546-CA, filed September 18,
2003

24

Transcript from the
Court of Appeals Arguments

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

RUSSELL PACKARD DEVELOPMENT,
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P R O C E E D I N G S
MR. STEPHENS:

If it please the Court, I'm

Brent Stephens of the law firm of Snow, Christensen &
Martineau, and the plaintiff and the appellants in this
case.
And the relief sought here is a reversal,
speedily, I hope, of the granting of the defendants1
and all three of them, motion to dismiss under
Rule 12(b)(6), for failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted.
Now, either I was incomprehensible in the
court below, or Judge Frederick became confused as to
what I was claiming, or -- probably both, or perhaps
even because of the defendants' sophisticated but
thoughtless arguments.
The motion of the defendants was not well
taken at all.
The facts are these.

And this is a

common-law, broad, garden-variety case.
The plaintiffs are developers of real estate
in -- from California originally.

They take plats and

they build houses on them.
Thomas, one of the defendants, who was a
local builder here, was approached by Russell to form a
company called PRP Limited Liability Company, to do the

16

MR. MEADE:

Well, you have the Frandsen

case, where the period of time was very close to what
we're dealing with here.

I think it was six months.

And that's where we are.
And, again, it's based -- the discovery rule
in the four-year statute is -- is strictly an equitable
instrument that would extend the period of time if you
don't have the opportunity to file it within the
four-year statute of limitations.
JUDGE THORNE:
out the six claims?

So in your view, that washes

We've got two left, is that

right?
MR. MEADE:

You've got two left.

JUDGE THORNE: Okay.
MR. MEADE:

So one of the two is the

commercial bribery claim.

And that -- and Mr. Pratt

argued that in the brief.

And it's not really even

been responded to in the briefing.

And I think the

Court needs to assume that the plaintiffs concede that
this commercial bribery claim just doesn't exist,
because -- for the reasons that Mr. Pratt argued in his
brief.
Then you have the fraud claim.

And I think

the fraud claim was properly dismissed for a number of
reasons.

One -- only one of which has to do with the

1 /

statute of limitations.
Let me back up —
MR. STEPHENS:

We'll concede the commercial

bribery claim.
JUDGE THORNE:

Did Judge Frederick explain

why he dismissed these, or are you trying to dealve
into possibilities?
MR. MEADE:

Well, he -- I think his ruling

was fairly limited except for the reasons set forth in
the memorandum, and in the arguments.
And I'm not advancing anything that wasn't
argued to Judge Frederick.
I mean, he doesn't --he did not, it's my
recollection, go into detail on the fraud claim.
I will -- you know, there was a motion made
inviting him to reconsider his ruling by the plaintiff.
And, you know, I'm sure he looked at it, and
went back, and he ruled, you know, that his prior
ruling stood.
So no more detail than that.
Initially we argued at the trial court, and
argued here, that the fraud claim was not pled with
sufficient particularity, and, more importantly, that
some of the elements of fraud are missing.

Mainly,

that there was some kind of a representation made to

18

1

Russell by any of these defendants.

There is simply no

2

allegation in the complaint that there was this type of

3

misrepresentation.
And if Russell was confused, or didn't pay

4
5

attention to the details of the transaction, that

6

doesn't turn it into fraud.
In paragraph 65 of the amended complaint --

7
8

here is the allegation of misrepresentation.
Defendants represented to Saratoga that CMT

9
LO

was part of, affiliated with, or owned by the

LI

plaintiffs.

12

So their fraud claim is based on some

13

alleged misrepresentation made to the seller, not to

14

Russell.

15

Now -- and this was made in an amended

16

pleading, so I think they have to assume that they're

17

doing the best they can.

18

And I think it would be important to

19

consider the situation of the parties in the

20

transaction.

21

Russell is not a party to the transaction.

22

Russell and Thomas are members of the limited liability

23

company PRP.

24
25

It's admitted in the amended complaint that
Thomas was an agent and fiduciary of Mr. Russell in his
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BILLINGS, Associate Presiding Judge:
fl
Russell/Packard Development, Inc., and Lawrence Russell
(collectively, Russell) appeal from the district court's order
granting motions to dismiss in favor of Joel Carson, William
Bustos, and John Thomas. We reverse and remand.
BACKGROUND
f2
In 1996, Lawrence Russell was the principal shareholder and
chief executive officer of Russell/Packard Development, Inc., a

California corporation1 engaged in real estate development in
California. When Mr. Russell became interested in developing
residential real estate in Utah, he teamed with John Thomas
(Thomas), a Utah real estate agent and a managing member of
Premier Homes, L.C., to organize a Utah limited liability company
called PRP Development, L.C. (PRP). Thomas was the manager of
PRP and hence a fiduciary of Russell and PRP. PRP began pursuing
real estate development activities in Utah.
f3
In 1996, Saratoga Springs Development, L.C. (Saratoga), a
company owned by Lynn Wardley, was developing and marketing land
for residential construction. Saratoga owned seventy-two
undeveloped twin-home lots (the lots) in the city of Saratoga
Springs, Utah. Saratoga retained the brokerage services of
Wardley Better Homes and Gardens Brokerage Co. (Wardley) to
market and sell the lots. Dan Cary (Cary), a Wardley agent, was
the listing agent for the lots. Joel Carson (Carson) and William
Bustos (Bustos) were also real estate agents with Wardley.
Unbeknownst to Russell, Carson had a business relationship with
Bustos and Bustos had previously engaged in real estate dealings
with Thomas. Also unbeknownst to Russell, Thomas owed Bustos
money from previous business dealings. Thomas retained Carson on
behalf of PRP and Russell to locate and review real estate
proposals for purchase and development by PRP. As such, Carson
became a fiduciary of PRP.
1[4
In the summer of 1996, Carson, Thomas, and Bustos learned of
the availability of the Saratoga lots. At the urging of Carson
and Bustbs, Thomas approached Cary about purchasing the lots from
Saratoga through PRP.
f5
However, in the fall of 1996, Carson, Thomas, and Bustos,
through an entity known as CMT, Inc. (CMT), made a separate offer
to purchase the lots from Saratoga for $25,000 per lot. Carson
told Cary that CMT was affiliated with or owned by Russell and
PRP. Throughout the negotiations, Carson and Thomas, through
their actions and representations to Saratoga, created the
appearance that PRP was actively pursuing the purchase of the
lots. Consequently, Wardley and Saratoga believed they were
negotiating the purchase of the lots with PRP directly. To
further disguise CMT's illegitimacy, Carson, Thomas, and Bustos
misappropriated Russell's proprietary plans to develop the lots
and presented them to Saratoga as their own. As a result of the
same conduct, Russell erroneously believed CMT was owned by,
affiliated with, or part of Saratoga.

1. Russell/Packard Development, Inc., was licensed through the
Utah Department of Commerce to do business in Utah as a foreign
corporation.

%6
In fact, during the negotiations and execution of the PRP
contract, CMT was merely a fictitious name used by Carson,
Thomas, and Bustos, having no legal status in Utah or elsewhere.2
On November 4, 1996, CMT and Saratoga executed a real estate
contract listing Cary as the agent for Saratoga and Carson as the
agent for CMT. The CMT contract was signed by Saratoga's
authorized agent and by "Charles Perez" on behalf of CMT.3
Saratoga and CMT closed on the CMT contract the same day they
executed it, with Saratoga still erroneously believing it was
contracting with PRP through PRP's affiliate, CMT. The title
company CMT used to close the transaction received an earnest
money wire in the amount of $10,000 from an entity known as Poe
Investments, L.C. (Poe), whose members were Carson and Bustos.
At closing. Bustos received a check for part of this $10,000
earnest money payment.
1(7 After the CMT contract closed on November 4, 1996, Thomasacting for PRP--made an offer to purchase the lots from CMT for
$30,000 per lot. PRP and CMT executed a real estate contract
(the PRP contract) on November 8, 1996. Thomas signed on behalf
of PRP. "Charles Perez" again signed on behalf of CMT. Carson
acted as the real estate agent for both PRP and CMT on the PRP
contract. The terms of the PRP contract were identical to those
of the CMT contract, except that the price per lot was $5,000
higher. By failing to reveal to Russell, PRP, and Saratoga that
they were acting as agents and principals for CMT at the same
time they were acting as agents and fiduciaries of Russell and
PRP, Carson, Thomas, and Bustos successfully effectuated a "flip
purchase and sale," and pocketed $360,000 in the process.
Neither Russell nor Saratoga knew what had occurred. However,
CMT was listed as the seller both in the PRP contract and in the
chain of title on the lots.
f8
In spring 2000, an accountant for Saratoga questioned CMT's
true role in the 1996 transactions involving the lots.5
2. CMT, Inc. was incorporated as a California corporation on
December 5, 1996, after the CMT contract was signed. CMT has
never been registered to do business in the state of Utah.
3. A person named "Charles Perez" is believed to have been
associated with CMT, though Russell alleges it is unsure how.
4. Poe was organized in Utah on July 19, 1996, and involuntarily
dissolved on August 22, 1997.
5. By this time, Russell and Thomas had dissolved PRP. In the
1997 dissolution, Russell purchased all rights, title, and
interest in the PRP contract, including the right to purchase the
(continued...)

Suspecting a "flip purchase and sale" had occurred, Saratoga
initiated discussions with Russell wherein Russell learned for
the first time that CMT was not an agent for Saratoga.
Subsequently, Russell conducted further investigation concerning
the ownership and control of CMT and the circumstances
surrounding PRP ! s purchase of the lots.
H9
On November 30, 2001, Russell filed a complaint against
Carson, Thomas, and Bustos alleging fraud, breach of fiduciary
duty as to Carson and Thomas, civil conspiracy to defraud,
commercial bribery, unjust enrichment, conversion and
misappropriation of proprietary property, breach of principalagent relationship as to Carson and Thomas, and intentional
interference with prospective economic relations. Carson,
Thomas, and Bustos filed motions to dismiss asserting a number of
grounds for dismissal. On June 10, 2002, the district court
dismissed Russell's claims with prejudice. Russell appeals.
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1fl0 Russell argues the district court erred in dismissing its
claims against Carson, Thomas, and Bustos (collectively, the
Appellees). "When determining whether a trial court properly
granted a rule 12(b) (6) motion to dismiss, we accept the factual
allegations in the complaint as true and consider them and all
reasonable inferences to be drawn from them in a light most
favorable to the plaintiff." Saint Benedict's Dev. Co. v. Saint
Benedicts Hosp. , 811 P.2d 194, 196 (Utah 1991) . "Because the
propriety of a 12(b) (6) dismissal is a question of law, we give
the trial court's ruling no deference and review it under a
correctness standard." Russell v. Standard Corp., 898 P.2d 263,
264 (Utah 1995) (quotations and citations omitted). We "will
affirm the trial court's decision only if it appears [Russell]
cannot prove any set of facts in support of [its] claims."
Dansie v. Anderson Lumber Co., 878 P.2d 1155, 1156 (Utah Ct. App.
1994) J

5 . (...continued)
lots pursuant to the terms of the contract.
6. The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provide that "[t]he
[district] court shall . . . issue a brief written statement of
the ground for its decision on all motions granted under . . .
12(b)." Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a) (citing Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)).
While rule 52(a) allows for brevity in such supporting
statements, we have specifically condemned the practice employed
by the district court in this case wherein the court merely
grants the motion "for the reasons set forth in the [prevailing
(continued...)

ANALYSIS
I.
A.

Timeliness of Claims

Statutes of Limitations

Ull Under Utah law, Russell's claim for fraud is subject to a
three-year statute of limitations. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-1226(3) (2002). Russell's claims for breach of fiduciary duty,
civil conspiracy, unjust enrichment, conversion and
misappropriation, breach of principal-agent relation, and
intentional interference with prospective economic relations
(collectively, the four-year claims) are subject to a four-year
statute of limitations. See id. § 78-12-25(3) (2002). Russell
concedes that, absent tolling, its fraud claim expired on
November 7, 1999, its four-year claims expired on November 7,
2000, and thus its November 30, 2001 complaint was untimely.
B.

The Discovery Rule

1Jl2 In most cases "a cause of action accrues" and the "statutes
of limitations begin running upon the happening of the last event
necessary to complete the cause of action." Spears v. Warr, 2002
UT 24,1(33, 44 P.3d 742 (quotations and citations omitted).
Moreover, "mere ignorance of the existence of a cause of action
does not prevent the running of the statute of limitations."
Warren v. Provo City Corp., 838 P.2d 1125, 1129 (Utah 1992)
(quotations and citations omitted). Russell concedes that,
absent tolling through application of the discovery rule, "the
point at which [Russell] reasonably should [have] known" of its
legal injuries is November 8, 1996, the day PRP and CMT executed
the PRP contract. Spears, 2002 UT 24 at ^32.
1|l3 However, in some cases, "the discovery rule tolls the
limitations period until facts forming the basis for the cause of
action are discovered." Id. Utah courts apply the discovery
rule
(1) in situations where the discovery rule is
mandated by statute; (2) in situations where

6.
(..- continued)
party's] supporting memorandum . . . [without] explain[ing] the
basis for its decision." Gabriel v. Salt Lake City Corp., 2001
UT App 277,1(9, 34 P. 3d 234. Given the complexity of the issues
in this case, we could reverse and remand based solely on the
district court's failure to explain the basis of its decision.
However, in the interest of expediting this case, we proceed to
the merits. Nonetheless, we urge trial courts to explain the
basis of their decisions when there are multiple issues before
the court.

a plaintiff does not become aware of the
cause of action because of the defendant's
concealment or misleading conduct; and (3) in
situations where the case presents
exceptional circumstances and the application
of the general rule would be irrational or
unjust, regardless of any showing that the
defendant has prevented the discovery of the
cause of action.
Id. (quoting Warren, 838 P.2d at 1129). Russell contends the
limitation periods were tolled because: (1) the discovery rule
applies to a claim for fraud by statutory mandate; and (2) the
Appellees' concealment justifies application of the concealment
prong of uhe discovery rule to Russell's four-year claims.
1.

Fraudulent Concealment

1l4 In Berenda v. Langford, 914 P.2d 45 (Utah 1996), our supreme
court noted that in cases not involving allegations of
concealment, inquiry notice on the part of the plaintiff is
enough to trigger the running of the limitations period. See id.
at 51-52 (citing United Park City Mines Co. v. Greater Park City,
Co., 870 P.2d 880, 889 (Utah 1993) (refusing to toll the statute
of limitations where a proxy statement provided sufficient
information to put shareholders on notice of the need for further
inquiry)). Hence, absent concealment, the statutes of
limitations on Russell's claims began running in 1996 when
Russell was put on notice of CMT's involvement by the PRP
contract's closing papers and the subsequently recorded deeds.
See Johannessen v. Canyon Road Towers Owners Ass'n, 2 0 02 UT App
332,^(23, 57 P. 3d 1119 ("Constructive notice is imparted when
documents are properly recorded." (quotations and citation
omitted)).
^[15 "However, under our case law the rule is otherwise when a
plaintiff alleges that a defendant took affirmative steps to
conceal the plaintiff's cause of action . . . ." Berenda, 914
P.2d at 51. In such a situation, the concealment prong of the
discovery rule applies to toll the statute of limitations on the
plaintiff's claims, regardless of inquiry or constructive notice.
See Seale v. Gowans, 923 P.2d 1361, 1365 (Utah 1996).
"[U]nder
the discovery rule, 'it is the knowledge of injury' which
triggers the statute, 'not notice of probable or possible
injury.'" Id. (citation omitted). If the plaintiff can make "a
prima facie showing of fraudulent concealment and then
demonstrate that, given the defendant's actions, a reasonable
plaintiff would not have discovered the claim earlier," the
statute of limitations is tolled. Berenda, 914 P.2d at 51
(citing Vincent v. Salt Lake County, 583 P.2d 105, 107 (Utah
1978) (holding that the plaintiff's reasonable reliance on the

c

defendant's misrepresentations tolled the statute of limitations
until discovery of the cause of the damage) (other citations
omitted)). 7
a.

Threshold Issue

Hl6 "The first step in determining whether the discovery rule
applies is to examine whether [Russell] made the threshold
showing that [Russell] did not know, nor should have known," of

7. The Appellees continue to argue that because Russell was put
on notice of its claims in spring of 2000--several months before
the four-year statutes of limitations expired in summer 2000-Russell was obligated to file its complaint before the running of
the statute. The Appellees reason that because Russell did not
file its complaint until November 2001, Russell's claims are
time-barred. To support this reasoning, the Appellees cite
Atwood v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 823 P.2d 1064 (Utah 1992) and
Bricrham Young Univ. v. Paulsen Construction Co. , 744 P.2d 1370
(Utah 1987). However, both of these cases are factually f
distinguishable from this case because neither involved
allegations of fraudulent concealment.
In Atwood, the supreme court held that "[w]hile the
discovery rule has often been applied to give a plaintiff the
opportunity to file his action after learning certain critical
facts, the discovery rule has no application here" where the
plaintiff "d[id] not suggest any reason why the action could not
have been filed between the spring of 1988"--when the plaintiff
learned of his cause of action--"and October 11 of that y e a r " —
when the statute of limitations expired on his claim. 823 P.2d
at 1065. Unlike the plaintiff in Atwood, Russell has alleged
fraudulent concealment as the reason Russell could not file its
claims prior to summer 2000.
In Brigham Young, the supreme court refused to apply the
discovery rule to toll the statute of limitations because the
plaintiff "knew of its cause of action . . . three and a half
years before the limitations period expired," and where "an
action easily could have been filed between the date of discovery
and the end of the limitation period." 744 P.2d at 1374. Again,
unlike Russell, the plaintiff in Bricrham Young did not allege
fraudulent concealment as a justification for filing suit after
the statute of limitations ostensibly expired.
Hence, in Atwood and Brigham Young, the supreme court
refused to apply the discovery rule because there were no
allegations of fraud and because in both cases the plaintiffs
could have ""filed" prior to the running of the limitations period.
Our reading of Utah law leads us to conclude that this rule does
not apply here where Russell alleged fraudulent concealment. As
we discuss in detail later in this section, we conclude that
Berenda v. Langford, 914 P.2d 45 (Utah 1996), controls this case.

its causes of action against the Appellees prior to being put on
notice of a potential fraudulent transaction by Saratoga in
spring 2000. Sevy v. Security Title Co., 902 P.2d 629, 634 (Utah
1995); see also O'Neal v. Division of Family Servs., 821 P.2d
1139, 1144 (Utah 1991) (noting that "a threshold showing that
[the plaintiff] did not know and could not reasonably have known
of the existence of a cause of action . . . seem[s] a
definitional prerequisite to reliance on any version of the
discovery rule").
Hl7 The Utah Supreme Court has held that a plaintiff's actual
knowledge of a cause of action prevents the plaintiff from
satisfying the threshold showing. See O'Neal, 821 P.2d at 1144
(citing. Brigham Young Univ. v. Paulsen Constr. Co., 744 P.2d
1370, 1374 (Utah 1983); Auerbach Co. v. Key Sec. Police, Inc.,
680 P.2d 740, 743-44 (Utah 1984); Becton Dickinson & Co. v.
Reese, 668 P.2d 1254, 1257 (Utah 1987); Lord v. Shaw, 665 P.2d
1288, 1290-91 (Utah 1983)). In the case before us, neither party
alleges, nor does the record reflect, that Russell had or should"
have had actual knowledge of its claims against the Appellees at
the time of the execution of the PRP contract.
Hl8 However, there is no dispute that the PRP contract and the
deeds for the lots indicate CMT's involvement in the
transactions. The Appellees argue that because CMT was named in
these documents, Russell should have been aware of its injury and
cannot satisfy the threshold showing.
1fl9 The; case of Sevy v. Security Title Co., 902 P.2d 629 (Utah
1995), is instructive. In Sevy, the plaintiffs satisfied the
threshold showing even where there were "some undisputed facts
indicat[ing] that [the plaintiffs] should have become aware of
their injury at closing." Id. at 634, 636 (quotations and
'citation omitted). In that case, the plaintiff was awarded
damages by the district court for a title company's negligent
failure to deliver stock certificates to the plaintiff at
closing, pursuant to the terms of a real estate purchase
contract.
See id. at 631. Even though the statute of
limitations would normally have run on the plaintiff's claim, the
plaintiff asserted the discovery rule applied to toll the statute
of limitations. See id. at 634. The plaintiff contended that he
met the discovery rule's threshold showing--that he did not and

8. Because the certificates were never delivered, the
plaintiff's security interest in the shares was not perfected and
because of subsequent transfers of the stock certificates, a
third party sought to foreclose on the stock and sued to have the
district court declare the third party's security interest was
valid, perfected, and free from claims by the plaintiff. See
S e w v. Security Title Co., 902 P.2d 629, 631 (Utah 1995).

should not have known of the negligence at the time of closing-because the recording of a trust deed led him to believe his
security interest was perfected regardless of the defendant title
company's failure to deliver the stock certificates. See id. at
636. The defendant title company argued that the plaintiff
should have known of the negligence, and that his security
interest was not perfected at closing when no stock certificates
were forthcoming. See id. at 634. Noting that the district
court's finding was a question of fact, see id. at 634, the S e w
court affirmed the district court's ruling, holding that despite
evidence tending to show that the plaintiff should have known of
his claim upon the defendant title company's failure to deliver
the stock certificates, the plaintiff "neither knew nor should
have known of [the defendant title company's] negligence until
after the statute of limitations period had run." Id. at 63 6.
1(20 Similarly in our case, Russell alleges that despite the
presence of CMT's name in the closing documents and the recorded
deeds, Russell did not and should not have known of its claims at
closing, and therefore that the threshold requirement is met for
application of the discovery rule. Russell argues it is
commonplace to use multiple legal entities in complex development
transactions, and therefore the Appellees' use of CMT's name did
not, of itself, alert Russell of any potential or actual
problems. Because of the standard of review on a rule 12(b)(6)
dismissal, we accept Russell's assertions that it should not have
known of its claims simply because CMT was listed in the PRP
contract and the deeds. Hence, we conclude Russell has satisfied
the threshold showing for purposes of surviving a motion to
dismiss.
b.

The Concealment Prong of the Discovery Rule

H21 Our supreme court has held that application of the
concealment prong of the discovery rule to toll a statute of
limitations requires the plaintiff to "make a prima facie showing
of fraudulent concealment and then demonstrate that, given the
defendant's actions, a reasonable plaintiff would not have
discovered his or her claim earlier." Berenda v. Langford, 914
P.2d 45, 53 (Utah 1996). This standard requires consideration of
"the difficulty a plaintiff may have in recognizing and
diligently discovering a cause of action when a defendant
affirmatively and fraudulently conceals it." Id. at 54.
Significantly, the Berenda court "explicitly acknowledge[d] that
weighing the reasonableness of the plaintiff's conduct in light
of the defendant's steps to conceal the cause of action
necessitates the type of factual findings which preclude summary
judgment in all but the clearest of cases." Id. at 53. "Close
calls are for juries, not judges, to make." Id. at 54
(quotations and citations omitted).

H22 To support the contention that the Appellees concealed their
wrongful conduct after defrauding Russell via the "flip purchase
and sale," Russell alleges in its complaint that:
[] At the time the CMT contract, signed
on November 4, 1996, and the PRP contract,
signed on November 8, 1996, were executed,
Carson, Bustos, and Thomas set on a course of
conduct through agreement to conceal from
plaintiffs and Saratoga CMT's relationship to
the defendants and CMT's lack of relationship
to the plaintiffs and Saratoga.
[] This concealment was a necessarypart of the scheme and device to permit the
CMT contract to be signed by Saratoga on
November 4, 1996, and to "flip the sale" to
PRP on November 8, 1996.
[] This intentional concealment and
failure to disclose to plaintiffs the fact
that CMT was not owned by or controlled
through Saratoga or, as to Saratoga, CMT was
not owned by or in the control of plaintiffs,
plaintiffs and Saratoga would not have
permitted the flip purchase and sale through
CMT while Carson and Thomas were acting as
agents and fiduciaries of plaintiffs or to
benefit Bustos.
[] Plaintiffs did not discover that CMT
was not the agent for . . . Saratoga, in
connection with the sale of the lots, until
spring of 2000, when an accountant working
for Saratoga discovered the possibility of a
flip sale and purchase which prompted
discussions between Russell on the one hand,
and a representative of Saratoga on the other
hand.
[] At all times previous to that,
defendant formulated a scheme in which
plaintiffs were introduced to Saratoga by the
defendants and always referred to as the
builder or buyer, and Saratoga's
representatives were introduced to plaintiffs
by the defendants and always referred to as
the seller or developer.
[] On information and belief, in the
spring of 2000, an accountant for Saratoga

questioned the ownership or control status of
CMT, in connection with the . . . closing of
the last twelve lots [under the PRP
contract] .

[] This affirmative conduct and
concealment of the defendants constituted a
pattern during October and November 1996
during the sale and continued thereafter
through spring of 2 0 00 that CMT was known
only to plaintiffs as Saratoga's agent or
company owned by or under the control of
Saratoga. The active concealment continued
until spring of 2000 by the defendants.
[] After the conversation with
Saratoga's representatives concerning CMT's
actual status, further inquiry and
investigations were made by plaintiffs
concerning the ownership and control of CMT
and the circumstances of the two contracts
signed in November 1996 by plaintiffs and
Saratoga.
H23 We look to pertinent case law for guidance in determining
whether these allegations are sufficient to support fraudulent
concealment by the Appellees and reasonable action in the face
thereof by Russell.
124 In Hill v. Allred, 2001 UT 16, 28 P.3d 1271, the district
court granted summary judgment9 in favor of the defendants on the

9. Only in the context of summary judgment have Utah appellate
courts addressed the issue of whether a plaintiff successfully
made the prima facie showing of fraudulent concealment and then
demonstrated that, in light of the defendant's actions, a
reasonable plaintiff would not have discovered the cause of
action sooner. In such cases, Utah appellate courts examined the
pleadings and factual evidence relating to when the plaintiffs
would reasonably have been on notice that further inquiry was
needed and whether the plaintiff, once on notice, reasonably
should have discovered the facts despite the defendants" efforts
to hide them. See, e.g., Hill v. Allred, 2001 UT 16,1(18-20, 28
P.3d 1271; Berenda v. Lancrsford, 914 P.2d 45, 51, 54 (Utah 1996);
Warren v. Provo City Corp., 838 P.2d 1125, 1130-31 (Utah 1992);
Chapman v. Primary Children's Hosp., 784 P.2d 1181, 1184 (Utah
1989) . In this case, however, we are reviewing a grant of a
(continued...)

basis of an expired statute of limitations. See id. at %l.
On
appeal, the supreme court found that the plaintiff "met her
burden of making a prima facie showing of fraudulent concealment"
where the plaintiff submitted affidavits from five different
people to bolster her allegations that the defendants had taken
affirmative steps to conceal her cause of action. Id. at Hl9.
'She also alleged two meetings in which the defendants lied to her
regarding the whereabouts of her stolen money. See id.
Accordingly, the supreme court reversed summary judgment and
remanded for the district court to weigh the reasonableness of
the plaintiff's conduct in the face of the defendant's fraudulent
concealment to determine whether the concealment prong of the
discovery rule applied to toll the statute of limitations on the
plaintiff's claims. See id', at H1J17-22.
^25 At first glance, the concealment in Hill appears more
egregious than the concealment pled by Russell in this case.
However, on closer examination, Carson and Thomas had fiduciary
obligations to Russell with the attendant "duty to speak the
truth." Chapman v. Primary Children's Hosp., 784 P.2d 1181, 0.186
(Utah 1989). Therefore, material omissions such as Carson's and
Thomas's failure to disclose to Russell the true involvement of
CMT are similar to the defendant's lies in Hill.
t26 Likewise, in Berenda v. Langford, 914 P.2d 45 (Utah 1996),
the supreme court reversed a grant of summary judgment after the
district court refused to apply the concealment prong of the
discovery rule. See id. at 47, 50. In that case, the defendant
asked our supreme court to affirm because, in the defendant's
view, two letters written by the plaintiff evincing suspicion of
the defendant's wrongful conduct were enough to start the statute
of limitations running such that the plaintiff's claims were
time-barred.10 See id. at 50. The supreme court reversed and

9. (...continued)
motion to dismiss and hence our standard of review is more
deferential to the plaintiff. We "must accept the factual
allegations in the complaint as true and consider all reasonable
inferences . . . from those facts in a light most favorable to
the plaintiff." Prows v. State, 822 P.2d 764, 766 (Utah 1991).
We think the posture of this case weighs heavily in favor of
reversal.
10. Berenda 914 P.2d 45 (Utah 1996) was decided under a statute
of limitations that contained an internal discovery rule like the
fraud statute in this case. See id. at 51 n.2. Nevertheless,
the court looked to case law decided under statutes of
limitations without internal discovery rules because the
plaintiff's allegations that the defendants fraudulently
(continued...)

remanded where the plaintiff "presented a prima facie case" of
fraudulent -concealment because "weighing the reasonableness of
the plaintiff's conduct" in the face of fraudulent concealment to
determine whether the statute of limitations was tolled is the
province of juries rather than judges. Id. at 53-54.
^[27 In Chapman, our supreme court faced a "close call." 784
P.2d at 1186. There, the plaintiffs moved to dismiss without
prejudice their own malpractice suit against a physician after
the defendants allegedly misled and misinformed the plaintiffs
about the viability of their claim. See id. at 1183. After
receiving medical records containing the facts underlying their
cause of action, the plaintiffs later renewed their malpractice
suit, but only after the statute normally would have run. See
id. at 1183-84. Balancing the misinformation the plaintiffs
allegedly received against the actions of the plaintiffs in light
of this misinformation, the Chapman court determined the
plaintiffs were "entitled to their day in court" and reversed a
grant of summary judgment. Id. at 1186. The court left for the
jury the determination of whether, given the defendant's
concealment, the plaintiffs "were sufficiently alerted to the
possibility of medical malpractice at the time of [their f
daughter's] cardiac arrest to start the statute of limitations
running or whether . . . [the plaintiffs] should reasonably have
disregarded [the misinformation] and made an independent
inquiry." Id. In essence, the court left for the fact-finder
the determination of whether or not to apply the discovery rule.
i[2 8 Russell's pleadings, set out above, clearly allege that the
Appellees mislead and misinformed Russell as to CMT's true nature
and involvement in the sale of the lots. Under our standard of
review in a grant of a rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, and in light of
the foregoing authority regarding the fact-finder's role in
determining the applicability of the discovery rule, we hold the
district court erred in granting the Appellees' motions to
dismiss.n
10. (...continued)
concealed the plaintiff's claims required the court in either
case to "balance[] the reasonableness of the plaintiff in
pursuing its claim against the defendant's affirmative actions to
conceal." Id. at 52.
11. Because Russell's fraud claim is governed by a statute of
limitations that includes an internal discovery rule, our
analysis differs slightly from the foregoing concealment prong
analysis. The pertinent statutory language provides that "[a]n
action may be brought within three years . . . for relief on the
ground of fraud or mistake; except that the cause of action in
(continued...)

II.

Standing as to Fraud Claim

f29 Alternatively, the Appellees argue the district court
properly dismissed Russell's fraud claim because Russell lacks
standing to bring the claim.12 Russell alleges in the pleadings
that when PRP was dissolved in 1997, PRP assigned
to Russell "all
of its rights, title and interest in the [PRP] Contract."
Russell argues this assignment "includ[ed] any claims relating to
the purchase of [the] lots." The Appellees argue, inter alia,
that Russell lacks standing because it could not have legally
acquired a cause of action for fraud from PRP through assignment.

11.
(...continued)
such case does not accrue until the discovery by the aggrieved
party of the facts constituting the fraud or mistake." Utah Code
Ann. § 78-12-26(3) (2002) (emphasis added). Interpreting this
statute, our supreme court held that "accrual of the cause of
action is not complete until discovery of the pertinent facts"
constituting the fraud. Hill, 2001 UT 16 at 1|l6 (citing Utah
Code Ann. § 78-12-26(3)). Hence, despite the Appellees1
arguments to the contrary, "the question is not whether the
discovery rule applies [to the fraud claim,] but [rather] when
[Russell] discovered [its] cause of action [for fraud] and so
triggered the running of the statute." Berenda, 914 P.2d at 56.
As we have discussed above, determining when the statute of
limitations began running is a fact question and, accordingly, we
hold the district court erred in granting the Appellees' motions
to dismiss the fraud claim.
12. The Appellees argue Russell's fraud claim does not pass
muster under rule 9(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
which requires fraud be pleaded with particularity. See Utah R.
Civ. P. 9(b). To support this assertion, the Appellees argue,
inter alia, that Russell failed to allege that the Appellees made
direct misrepresentations to Russell with regard to the
transactions involving the lots. However, the question is not
one of direct misrepresentations, but rather one of false
representations. See Israel Pagan Estate v. Cannon, 746 P.2d
785, 792 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) ("A person cannot be liable for
fraud unless he made the false representations himself,
authorized someone to make them for him, or participated in the
misrepresentation in some way, such as through a conspiracy.");
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 533 (1965) ("The maker of a
fraudulent misrepresentation is subject to liability for
pecuniary loss to another who acts in justifiable reliance upon
it if the misrepresentation, although not made directly to the
other, is made to a third person and the maker intends or has
reason to expect that its terms will be repeated or its substance
communicated to the other, and that it will influence his conduct
in the transaction . . . ." (emphasis added)).

Accordingly, we must determine whether a fraud claim is
assignable in Utah.
H3 0 We conclude that Mayer v. Rankin, 91 Utah 193, 63 P.2d 611
(1936), is controlling in this appeal. The facts and procedural
posture of Mayer are strikingly similar to those we face here.
In Mayer, the plaintiff brought a claim against the defendant for
fraud alleging that the defendant " 'devised a scheme to defraud
the plaintiff's assignors . . . by selling them stock . . . at
false and fictitious values. 1 " Id. at 613. Based on the
defendant's misrepresentations, the plaintiff's assignors
purchased the stock at a price higher than its actual trading
value, providing the defendant with significant ill-gotten
profits. See id. at 613-614. The defendant moved to dismiss the
plaintiff's action, asserting the plaintiff lacked standing to
bring the fraud claim because a cause of action for fraud was not
assignable. See id. at 612, 616. The supreme court noted that
although tort claims were not assignable at common law, "the rule
of nonassignability no longer extends to all actions arising [in
tort]" under Utah law. Id. (citing Wines v. Rio Grande W. Ry.
Co., 9 Utah 228, 33 P. 1042, 1045 (1893) (holding that an action
for negligent destruction of property is assignable); National
Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Denver & R.G.R. Co., 44 Utah 26, 137 P.
653, 654 (1913) (same); Lawler v. Jennings, 18 Utah 35, 55 P. 60,
61 (18 98) (holding that an action for money overpaid by mutual
mistake is assignable); Baglin v. Earl-Eagle Min. Co., 54 Utah
572, 184 P. 190, 193 (1919) (holding that a cause of action for
conversion is assignable)). The Mayer court also pointed out
that the Utah Supreme Court had previously held an action to
recover stock secured by fraud was an assignable claim. Id. at
616 (citing White v. Texas Co., 59 Utah 180, 202 P. 826, 830
(1921)) . In light of these prior holdings, the Mayer court could
find "no good reason why an action for the recovery of money
secured by fraud is not likewise assignable." Id. The Mayer
court held that "[w]hile a mere naked right to recover for fraud
is not assignable, . . . the weight of authority and . . . sound
legal principles [persuade us that] an assignment is upheld when
it carries with it a subsisting substantial right to property
independent of the right to sue for fraud." Id. at 616-17. The
supreme court reversed the district court's dismissal and
remanded the case with instructions to reinstate the plaintiff's
fraud claim. See id. at 618.
^31 We find Mayer indistinguishable from the present appeal.
Just as in Mayer, Russell alleges that the Appellees1 fraudulent
misrepresentations induced PRP to execute a real estate purchase
contract in which PRP agreed to pay a higher price for the
property than that for which it was presently selling. Like the
defendant in Mayer, the Appellees pocketed the ill-gotten profit
at the plaintiff's expense. In both cases, the property that the
plaintiffs seek to recover through their fraud claims is the

money "had [by the plaintiffs] and received [fraudulently by the
defendants]." Id. at 615. And like the plaintiff in Mayer,
Russell brought its fraud claim in the capacity of an assignee.
Thus, applying Mayer, we reverse the dismissal on the fraud claim
and allow Russell to pursue its claims against the Appellees.
III.

Fiduciary Duty as to Bustos

1(3 2 Russell contends the district court erred in dismissing
Russell's claims against Bustos. Bustos argues that he could not
have defrauded Russell because he never made any kind of
representation to PRP or Russell. Also, Bustos insists he owed
PRP and Russell no duty as a fiduciary, and that he therefore had
no duty to reveal his knowledge of the fraudulent scheme.
U33 Generally, "silence . . . in the absence of a duty to speak
. . . does not of itself constitute fraud." 37 C.J.S. Fraud § 18
(1997) (footnotes and citations omitted); cf. Jenson v. IHC
Hosps., Inc., 944 P.2d 327, 333 (Utah 1997) ("The party's silence
must amount to fraud.") . However, "[a] n exception to the
[general] rule . . . exists where the circumstances impose on a
person a duty to speak and he or she deliberately remains
silent." 37 C.J.S. Fraud § 19 (footnote and citation omitted);
see Jenson, 944 P.2d at 333. Furthermore, "[p]arties who
knowingly join a fiduciary in fraudulent acts, whereby the
fiduciary breaches his or her fiduciary duties, are jointly and
severally liable with that fiduciary." 37 Am. Jur. 2d Fraud and
Deceit, § 306 (2001) (citing Future Group, II v. Nationsbank, 478
S.E.2d 45 (S.C. 1996) (stating " [t]he gravamen of the claim [of
aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty] is the
defendant's knowing participation in the fiduciary's breach.")),*
see also United Park City Mines Co. v. Greater Park City Co., 870
P.2d 880, 884-885 (Utah 1993) (reviewing a grant of summary
judgment involving a cause of action for aiding and abetting a
fraud by breach of fiduciary duty).
^[34 Russell alleges in its complaint that: (1) Bustos schemed
with Thomas and Carson to purchase the lots and fraudulently
resell them to PRP; (2) Bustos made overt acts and
representations to induce Saratoga to sell the lots to CMT in the
belief that CMT was affiliated with PRP; (3) Bustos, along with
Carson and Thomas, made an offer to purchase the lots from
Saratoga through CMT for $25,000 per lot; (4) Bustos converted
and used Russell's proprietary development plans to further
disguise CMT's illegitimacy; (5) Bustos was a member of Poe, the
company that sent a $10,000 earnest money wire to the title
company to close the CMT contract; (6) Bustos received money in
the form of a check at the closing of the CMT contract; (7)
Bustos agreed to conceal from PRP the true nature of the "flip
purchase and sell" of the lots; (8) Bustos was a real estate
agent for Wardley along with Cary and Carson, both of whom

represented PRP; and (9) Bustos interjected himself, along with
Carson and Thomas, as undisclosed agents and principals for CMT
and Poe, while acting as agents and fiduciaries of PRP.
1(35 Based on these allegations and reasonable inferences drawn
therefrom, we accept that Bustos made overt acts and
representations for the purpose of inducing PRP to execute the
PRP contract. We also accept that Bustos schemed with the
Appellees to commit fraud and later agreed to conceal the fraud
in furtherance of the scheme. Likewise, we accept that Bustos
aided Carson and Thomas in breaching their fiduciary duties
toward PRP.13 Accordingly, we reverse the dismissal of the fraud
claim against Bustos and remand for further proceedings.
CONCLUSION
1136 For the purposes of surviving a rule 12(b) (6) motion to
dismiss, we conclude the concealment prong of the discovery rule
applies to toll the statutes of limitations on Russell's claims
such that Russell's complaint was timely. Because Utah law
allows the assignment of a fraud claim, we conclude Russell has
standing to bring its cause of action for fraud. Finally, we
hold that Russell's allegations that Bustos committed fraud
either by making false representations or by breaching fiduciary
duties are sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. In short,
we are not convinced that Russell cannot prove any set of facts

13. Russell alleges that Bustos did owe fiduciary duties to PRP.
In the posture of this case, we agree. Bustos was a real estate
agent with Wardley. Both Cary and Carson were Wardley agents at
the time the PRP contract was negotiated and executed. Cary
listed the lots and Carson represented PRP in its attempts to
purchase the lots. Bustos communicated with both Cary and Carson
regarding the lots. Bustos received money from transactions
involving the lots. Arguably, Bustos was an agent for PRP
because Wardley represented PRP. In fact, Russell alleges in its
complaint that Bustos "act[ed] as agent[] and fiduciar[y] of
[PRP] at the time the PRP contract was negotiated and executed."
The determination of "[w]hether or not a confidential or
fiduciary relationship exists depends on the facts and
circumstances of each individual case." First Sec. Bank of Utah
v. Banberry Dev. Corp., 786 P.2d 1326, 1332 (Utah 1990)
(quotations and citations omitted).

to support its claims, and therefore we reverse and remand for
further proceedings.
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